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Abstract—This paper investigates the secrecy performance of
full duplex relay networks. The resulting analysis shows that
full duplex relay networks have better secrecy performance
than half duplex relay networks, if the self-interference can be
well suppressed. We also propose a full duplex jamming relay
network, in which the relay node transmits jamming signals
while receiving the data from the source. While the full duplex
jamming scheme has the same data rate as the half duplex
scheme, the secrecy performance can be significantly improved,
making it an attractive scheme when the network secrecy is a
primary concern. A mathematic model is developed to analyze
secrecy outage probabilities for the half duplex, full duplex and
full duplex jamming schemes, and simulation results are also
presented to verify the analysis.
Index Terms—Physical layer secrecy, cooperative relay net-
works, full duplex relay, secrecy outage probability
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike a traditional cryptographic system [1], physical layer
security is based on Shannon theory using channel coding
(rather than encryption) to achieve secure transmission [2]–
[7]. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
both the intended receiver and eavesdropper may receive data
from the source. But if the capacity of the intended data
transmission channel is higher than that of the eavesdropping
channel, the data can be transmitted at a rate close to the
intended channel capacity so that only the intended receiver
(not the eavesdropper) can successfully decode the data. This
is the principle of physical layer security, where the level of
security is quantified by the secrecy capacity which is the
capacity difference between the intended data transmission and
eavesdropping channels.
It is interesting to notice that both cooperative relay and
physical layer security networks relay on wireless broadcast-
ing. This implies that the popular cooperative networks, which
have been well investigated to improve transmission capacity,
also provide an effective way to improve the secrecy capacity
[8], [9]. A typical relay network with an eavesdropper is shown
in Fig. 1, where there is one source node S, one relay node
R, one destination node D and one eavesdropper node E.
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The purpose of physical layer security in the cooperative
network is to prevent the eavesdropper from decoding the data
transmitted from S or R. This can be achieved by injecting
jamming signals into the network with the assumption that
the jamming power at the eavesdropper is higher than that
at the intended destination (e.g. [10]). The jamming signal
must be used with care as it may also deteriorate the intended
data transmission. This can be seen for example in [11] where
beamforming is used at the destination to reduce the negative
effect of the jamming signals at the intended relay node.
Current cooperative networks usually employ half duplex
relays (HDR-s) because of easy implementation. But this is
at the price of 50% loss in spectral efficiency as two time
slots are required to transmit one data packet. Full duplex
transmission, which was previously considered impractical due
to the associated self-interference, has attracted much attention
recently due to the progress in self-interference cancelation
techniques ( [12], [13]). For example, in [14], multiple antenna
were used to suppress the self-interference; in [15], [16], a
joint analog and digital cancellation technique was proposed
to mitigate the self-interference to the noise floor; in [17],
two analog/RF designs were proposed which can avoid using
bulky components and/or antenna structures in most existing
self-interference approaches. Of particular interest is when
the self-interference is significantly suppressed, the impact of
full duplex transmission on physical layer security. In [18]
and [19], the receiver operates in full duplex mode for better
secrecy because it can simultaneously receive the data from
the source and send a jamming signal to the eavesdropper.
Alternatively, in [20], it is the eavesdropper that is equipped
with the full duplex technology, so that the eavesdropper can
minimize the secrecy by receiving the data from the source
and transmitting jamming signals to the intended receiver
at the same time. These approaches consider the secrecy
performance of a point-to-point full duplex system, and little
work has been done for the full duplex relay network.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of
a full duplex relay network. In the full duplex network,
the eavesdropper simultaneously receives signals from the
source and relay which interfere with each other, making it
harder for the eavesdropper to decode the data. This decreases
the eavesdropping capacity, and then improves the secrecy
performance. Moreover, because full duplex does not suffer
from 50% loss in data rate, there is no 1=2 factor in both
data transmission and eavesdropping capacities, which also
leads to better secrecy performance. This will be investigated
in detail later in this paper. In order to further increase the
2secrecy performance, we propose a full duplex jamming relay
scheme, in which the relay simultaneously receives data from
the source and sends jamming signals to the eavesdroppers.
The proposed full duplex jamming scheme has good secrecy
outage performance, though its data rate is the same as that for
the half duplex scheme, making it an attractive scheme when
the network secrecy is a primary concern. The contributions
of the paper are listed as follows:
 We obtain a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage
probability in a half duplex relay network, for the case
that the eavesdropper can intercept the data from both
the source and destination. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time this has been done. In [9], the
secrecy performance of a relay selection secrecy system
is analyzed, but the resulting secrecy outage probability
is actually a lower bound. This point will be further
explained in Section II.
 We derive the maximum and (approximate) minimum
secrecy outage probability of a full duplex relay net-
work, which well approximates the true secrecy outage
probability. We also quantitatively compare the secrecy
performance of the half duplex and full duplex relay
networks.
 We propose a full duplex jamming network and analyze
its secrecy outage probability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II- IV analyze the secrecy performance for the half duplex, full
duplex and full duplex jamming relay networks respectively;
Section V gives numerical simulations to verify the analysis;
finally, Section VI summarizes the paper.
Fig. 1. The secrecy relay network with an eavesdropper.
II. HALF DUPLEX SECRECY RELAY NETWORK
In this section, we derive the secrecy outage probability of
the half duplex secrecy network, which is used as a baseline
to compare with a full duplex scheme and the newly proposed
full duplex jamming scheme. The system model is shown in
Fig. 1, where all nodes are equipped with a single antenna,
and the eavesdropper can intercept the data from both the
source S and relay R, and the relay applies the decode-and-
forward (DF) protocol. The channel coefficients for S ! R,
R ! D, S ! E and R ! E are denoted as hsr, hrd, hse
and hre, respectively. We assume that all channels experience
block Rayleigh fading and that the channels remain constant
over one block but vary independently from one block to
another. The corresponding channel gains, obtained as j =
jhj j2 (j 2 fsr; rd; se; reg), are independently exponentially
distributed with mean of j (j 2 fsr; rd; se; reg) respectively.
The noise at nodes R, D and E are denoted as nr(t), nd(t)
and ne(t) with variances of 2j (j 2 fr; d; eg) respectively. The
transmission powers at S and R are Es and Er, respectively.
We particularly note that, in this paper, we assume S and D
are well separated so that there is no effective direct S ! D
transmission link as in ( [9], [21]–[23]). On the other hand,
if the direct S ! D link exists, the destination D receives
signals from both the source S and relay R which need to
be separated. In the half-duplex scheme, this can be easily
achieved by letting S and R transmit at odd and even time slots
respectively. In the full duplex scheme, other approaches are
necessary for the signal separation. For example, multiple an-
tennas can be used to separate signals in the spatial domain and
CDMA can be used to separate signals with different spreading
codes for S and D respectively. Alternatively, network-coding
based approaches may be applied. To be specific, we assume
initially at time slot t = 1, S transmits data s(1) to both R and
D, and R has no data to transmit yet. At time t = 2, S and
R transmit data s(2) and s(1) to D respectively. Then at the
destination D, s(1) and s(2) can be separated by subtracting
the previously received s(1) (at time t = 1) from the current
received signal (at time t = 2). This process can be continued
until all data are transmitted. This is similar to the two-path
transmission in [24], [25]. The detail of this issue is beyond
the scope of this paper and will be left as an interesting topic
for future study.
A. Secrecy capacity
We assume at time t, the source transmits xs(t) to the relay
R, and the received signal at R is given by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) + nr(t); (1)
and the eavesdropper E intercepts the signal from S as
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) + ne(t): (2)
At time (t+ 1), if the relay R successfully decodes xs(t), it
forwards xs(t) to D. The received signals at D and E are
given by
yd(t+ 1) =
p
Erhrd(t+ 1)xs(t) + nd(t+ 1);
ye(t+ 1) =
p
Erhre(t+ 1)xs(t) + ne(t+ 1);
(3)
respectively. For notational convenience, the time index t is
ignored below unless necessary.
The secrecy capacity is defined as (see [4]),
Cs = [Ct   Ce]+; (4)
where [x]+ = max(x; 0), Ct and Ce are the capacities for
data transmission and eavesdropping respectively. Because the
relay applies DF, we have
Ct = min(Csr; Crd); (5)
3where Csr and Crd are the channel capacities for S ! R and
R ! D respectively. In order to concentrate on the secrecy
performance of the network, we assume the channel SNR is
high enough so that the relay and destination nodes can always
decode the data. Then we have
Csr =
1
2
log2(1 +
Esjhsrj2
2r
) ' 1
2
log2(sr);
Crd =
1
2
log2(1 +
Erjhrdj2
2d
) ' 1
2
log2(rd);
(6)
where we assume without losing generality that Er = Es = 1
and 2r = 
2
d = 1, so that the channel gains sr and
rd become the channel SNRs for S ! R and R ! D
respectively1. Similar assumption is used in the rest of the
paper.
Substituting (6) into (5) gives
Ct = min

1
2
log2(sr);
1
2
log2(rd)

: (7)
On the other hand, because the eavesdropper receives the
data xs(t) twice, from S and R at time t and (t + 1)
respectively, the eavesdropping capacity is obtained as
Ce =
1
2
log2

1 +
Esjhsej2 + Erjhrej2
2r

' 1
2
log2(se+re);
(8)
where se and re are the channel SNRs for S ! E and
R! E respectively. Note that the “1=2” factor in (7) and (8)
are due to the half duplex transmission at the relay node.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity
of the half duplex scheme as
CHDR =

1
2
log2(min(sr; rd)) 
1
2
log2(se + re)
+
=

1
2
log2

min(sr; rd)
se + re
+
:
(9)
B. Secrecy outage probability
From (9), the secrecy outage probability for the half duplex
relay scheme is given by
PHDR = P (CHDR < Rs) = P

min(sr; rd)
se + re
< 22Rs

;
(10)
where Rs is the target secrecy rate. Note that, because Rs  0,
we have P ([x]+ < Rs) = P (x < Rs) so that the operator
[:]+ can be removed in (10).
Letting X = min (sr; rd), Y = se+re and Z = X=Y ,
(10) becomes
PHDR = FZ(2
2Rs) =
Z 1
0
FX(2
2Rsy)fY (y)dy; (11)
where F (:) and f(:) are the cumulative density function (CDF)
and probability-density-function (PDF) respectively.
1The transmission and noise powers can always be normalized to unity
by “absorbing” into the corresponding channel SNR.
The CDF of X can be obtained as
FX(x) = 1  e 
x(sr+rd)
srrd ; (12)
and the PDF of Y is given by
fY (y) =
(
ye y=se
2se
; se = re
ey=re e y=se
se re e
  y(se+re)sere ; se 6= re
(13)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (11) gives the secrecy outage
probability of the half duplex secrecy network as (14) in the
top of the next page.
Before we leave this section, it is interesting to point out
that, while the eavesdropper listens to S and R at time t and
(t + 1) for the same data xs(t) respectively, it can be easily
assumed that the secrecy outage probability is the probability
that eavesdropper can decode xs(t) from either S or D. This
is however not correct as the eavesdropper will combine the
data from S and D together before it decodes the data. Similar
mistake unfortunately still appears in some recent publications
(e.g. in [26] though it is for the secrecy outage in a relay
selection cognitive radio network). Alternatively in [9], the
eavesdropping capacity of a relay selection secrecy system
is obtained by taking the maximum gain of the S ! E and
R! E channels, which is smaller than the true eavesdropping
capacity. And thus the resulting secrecy outage probability is
in fact a lower bound.
III. FULL DUPLEX SECRECY RELAY NETWORK
A. System model
The system model of a full duplex secrecy relay network
can also be shown in Fig. 1, except that the relay is now
equipped with two antennas for receiving and transmission
respectively. We assume that, at time slot t, the source S
transmits xs(t) to the relay R. The relay R receives data from
S with its receiving antenna, and at the same time uses its
transmission antenna to transmit the previously decoded signal
xs(t 1) to the destination. Because R receives and transmits
simultaneously, when R is receiving, it is interfered by its
own transmission which is called self-interference. Then the
received signal at R is given by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhrr(t)xs(t  1) + nr(t);
(15)
where hrr(t) is the residual self-interference after the self-
interference cancellation. It is often assumed that the self-
interference can be significantly suppressed2 (e.g. [12], [27])
so that hrr(t) can be regarded as an independent Rayleigh
distributed variable (e.g. [28], [29]). The received signal at
the destination D is similar to that in the half duplex scheme
which is given by
yd(t) =
p
Erhrd(t)xs(t  1) + nd(t): (16)
Because now the source and relay transmit simultaneously,
2Self-interference cancellation algorithms are beyond the scope of this
paper.
4PHDR =
22Rssere(sr + rd)
2 + (2rdsr + rd
2
sr)(re + se)
24Rssere(sr + rd)2 + 22Rs(2rdsr + rd
2
sr)(re + se) + 
2
sr
2
rd
: (14)
at time t, the received signal at the eavesdropper is given by
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhre(t)xs(t  1) + ne(t):
(17)
It is interesting to observe that (17) is similar to the inter-
symbol interference (ISI) channel, and thus the eavesdropping
capacity is expected to be lower than that in the half duplex
scheme. Assuming there are B data packets per block, and
stacking the received signals at the eavesdropper for all B
data in one block, (17) can be expressed in a matrix/vector
form as
ye = Hxs + ne; (18)
where ye = (ye[B+1];    ; ye[1])T, xs = (xs[B];    ; xs[1])T
and ne = (ne[B+1];    ; ne[1])T, andH is the eavesdropping
channel matrix which is given by
H =
266666664
p
Erhrep
Eshse
p
Erhrep
Eshse
p
Erhre
. . . p
Eshse
p
Erhrep
Eshse
377777775
(B+1)B;
(19)
and (:)T denotes the transpose operator.
B. Secrecy capacity
From (15), the channel capacity for S ! R is given by
Csr = log2

1 +
Esjhsrj2
Erjhrrj2 + 2r

' log2

sr
rr + 1

;
(20)
where the approximation holds over the high SNR range, and
similar to (6) the transmission and noise powers are normal-
ized to unity, so that rr and rr are the channel gains for the
S ! R and self-interference channels, respectively. Because
we assume self-interference can be significantly suppressed,
when the SNR is sufficiently high, we have sr  (rr + 1)
so that the approximation in (20) holds.
The channel capacity for R ! D is similar to that in the
half duplex scheme (as is shown in (6)) but without the “1=2”
factor due to the full duplex transmission. Then from (5), the
transmission capacity of the full duplex scheme is given by
Ct = log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

: (21)
On the other hand, from (18), the eavesdropping capacity
can be obtained as
Ce =
1
B
log2 detfI+HHHg; (22)
where det(:) and (:)H denote the matrix determinant and
Hermitian transpose respectively.
Substituting (21) and (22) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity
for the full duplex network
CFDR =
log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

  log2

(detfI+HHHg) 1B
+
:
(23)
C. Eavesdropping capacity
Below we further investigate the eavesdropping capacity Ce.
From the eigen-decomposition of HHH, (22) can be reformed
as
Ce =
1
B
log2
BY
b=1
(1 + b); (24)
where b is the bth eigenvalue of HHH. Because H is a
Toeplitz matrix, b is given by (see [30])
b = (jhsej2+jhrej2)+2jhsehrejcos
b
B + 1
; b 2 f1; 2; :::; Bg:
(25)
Substituting (25) into (24) gives
Ce = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

+
1
B
BX
b=1
log2
 
1 +
2jhsehrejcos bB+1
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
!
:
(26)
Because 2jhsehrejcos bB+1  2jhsehrej  jhsej2 + jhrej2 <
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1, we have 2jhsehrejcos bB+1jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
  1: (27)
For simplicity, we let u = (2jhsehrejcos bB+1 )=(jhsej2 +
jhrej2 + 1). Then using a Taylor expansion, we have
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u)
=
1
B
BX
b=1
1
ln 2

u  1
2
u2 +
1
3
u3   1
4
u4 +   

=
1
ln 2
 1
B
 
BX
b=1
u 
BX
b=1
1
2
u2 +
BX
b=1
1
3
u3  
BX
b=1
1
4
u4 +   
!
:
(28)
It is interesting to note that
PB
b=1 u
k = 0 if k is odd. Thus
the odd exponents in (28) are all zeros, so that we have
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u)
=   1
ln 2
 1
B
 
BX
b=1
1
2
u2 +
BX
b=1
1
4
u4 +   
!
 0;
(29)
where the equality holds for jhsej = 0 or jhrej = 0. Letting
Ce =  1=B
PB
b=1 log2(1 + u), and from (26) and (29), we
5have
Ce = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
 Ce
 log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

:
(30)
This implies that, except for the “1=2” factor, the eavesdrop-
ping capacity of the full duplex scheme is smaller than that of
the half duplex scheme, unless either the S ! E or R ! E
eavesdropping channel gain is zero. This is not surprising be-
cause in the full duplex scheme, the simultaneous transmission
from S and R interfere with each at the eavesdropper. Below
we further show how much such interference (or Ce ) affects
the eavesdropping capacity. Ignoring the high order terms in
(29), we have
Ce =  
1
B
BX
b=1
log2(1 + u) 
1
2 ln 2
 1
B
BX
b=1
1
2
u2
=
1
2 ln 2
 1
B


2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
2 BX
b=1
cos2
b
B + 1
=
1
2 ln 2


1
2
+
1
2B



2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1
2
:
(31)
Further noting that
2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2 + 1 <
2jhsehrej
jhsej2 + jhrej2  1; (32)
where equality holds jhsej = jhrej, then the maximum Ce
is approximately given by
Ce;max =
1
2 ln 2


1
2
+
1
2B

 1
4 ln 2
; (33)
where the approximation holds for large block size B.
Substituting (33) into (30), we have the minimum eaves-
dropping capacity which is approximately given by
Ce;min  log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2
  1
4 ln 2
: (34)
Recalling thatCe  0, it is clear from (30) that the maximum
eavesdropping capacity is given by
Ce;max = log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

; (35)
which is achieved when Ce = 0, or jhsej = 0 or jhrej = 0.
From the above analysis we conclude that, when either the
S ! E or R ! E eavesdropping channels is weak (either
jhsej or jhrej is close to zero), the eavesdropping capacity is
close to its maximum value which is given by (35). When the
S ! E and R ! E channels have similar gains (jhsej 
jhrej), the receiving eavesdropper is most severely interfered
with and the eavesdropping capacity is close to its minimum
given by (34).
On the other hand, Ce;max and Ce;min only differ by
approximately 1=(4 ln 2), which is a constant. When either
of the eavesdropping channels is strong enough, i.e. either
jhsej2 or jhrej2 is large such that log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

1=(4 ln 2), we have Ce  log2
 
1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2

. This
leads to an interesting result: the interference at the eaves-
dropper from the simultaneous transmission at S and R has
limited effect on the eavesdropping capacity especially for
strong eavesdropping channels.
D. Secrecy outage probability
From (23) and (30), the secrecy outage probability of the
full duplex scheme can be obtained as
PFDR = P (CFDR < Rs)
= P ([log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

   log2  1 + jhsej2 + jhrej2 Ce] < Rs)
 P ([log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

  
log2
 jhsej2 + jhrej2 Ce] < Rs);
(36)
where the approximation holds at high SNR. While it is
hard to obtain a closed form for (36) due to the presence of
Ce , we can obtain the minimum and maximum of the secrecy
outage probability which gives very good approximation to the
true value.
When Ce = 0, we have the maximum secrecy outage
probability, or the upper bound of PFDR, as
PFDR;max = P

XF
Y
< 2Rs

= FZ(2
Rs) =
Z 1
0
FXF (yf )fY (y)dy;
(37)
where XF = min

sr
rr+1
; rd

, Y = jhsej2 + jhrej2 and
Z = X=Y .
The PDF of Y , fY (y), is the same as that in the half
duplex scheme which is given by (13). The CDF of XF can
be obtained as
FXF (x) = 1 
sre
  x(sr+rd)srrd
sr + rrx
: (38)
Substituting (13) and (38) into (37) gives the upper bound
of the secrecy outage probability as (39) in the top of the
next page, where m = 2
Rsrdre+2
Rsresr+rdsr
2Rsrdrerr
, n =
2Rsrdse+2
Rssesr+rdsr
2Rsrdserr
, and Ei() is the exponential in-
tegral function, that is, Ei(a; b) =
R1
1
e xbx adx.
On the other hand, when Ce = Ce;max  1=(4 ln 2) as
is shown in (33), we obtain the approximate minimum secrecy
outage probability as
PFDR;min = FZ(2
Rs Ce;max)  FZ(2Rs  14 ln 2 ): (40)
We note that (40) is not a strict lower bound of PFDR, but it
gives accurate approximation of the best secrecy performance
of the full duplex scheme. This is because of the Tayler series
approximation used in (31).
E. Discussion
Compared with the half duplex scheme, there are several
factors that affect the secrecy capacity of the full duplex relay.
The first is that the full duplex scheme has no “1=2” factor
in both the transmission and eavesdropping capacities. This
is equivalent to halving the target secrecy rate, which leads
6PFDR;max = FZ(2
Rs)
=
8<: [
23Rsrd
3
se
2
rr+2
2Rsrd
2
sesr
2
rr+2
3Rssr
3
se
2
rr rdse2srrr2Rs+enEi(1;n)(rdse2sr2Rs+se3sr2Rs+rd3sr)]
2se
2
rr2
2Rs (2Rsrdse+2
Rssesr+rdsr)
; se = re
1
(se re)2Rsrr

2Rsrr(se   re) + sr(emEi(1;m)  enEi(1; n))

; se 6= re
(39)
to higher secrecy capacity according to the definition of the
secrecy capacity.
The second factor is the simultaneous transmission of the
source and relay nodes in the full duplex transmission. The
influence of the simultaneous transmission on the eavesdrop-
ping capacity has been analyzed in Section III-C. From the
analysis, we know that the simultaneous transmission in the
full duplex scheme does help to improve the secrecy capacity,
but the influence is limited. The most influence occurs when
the S ! E and R! E eavesdropping channels have the same
gains, which leads to decreasing the target rate by 1=(4 ln 2)
as is shown in (40). The least influence applies when either
of the eavesdropping channels is zero.
The third factor that influences the secrecy performance is
the self-interference at the relay due to the full duplex trans-
mission. It is clearly shown in (20) that the self-interference
channel rr decreases the channel capacities for S ! R,
which deteriorates the secrecy capacity of the full duplex
scheme. The impact of the self-interference on the secrecy
capacity will be investigated in the simulation section.
In summary, for the full duplex network, the first and second
factors improve the secrecy performance, and the third factor
deteriorates the secrecy performance. Because the second fac-
tor (the simultaneous transmission) has no significant effect on
the secrecy performance, the secrecy performance advantage
of the full duplex over the half duplex scheme mainly comes
from the “1=2” factor in the capacities, if the self-interference
can be sufficiently suppressed as it can in many systems.
IV. FULL DUPLEX JAMMING RELAY NETWORK
A. Secrecy capacity
This section proposes a full duplex jamming relay network.
The system model is the similar to that of the full duplex
scheme, but the relay R now switches between full and half
duplex operation. At time slot t, the relay works in full duplex
mode: the source S transmits data xs(t) to R, R receives
and decodes xs(t) from S. At the same time, R transmits the
jamming signal jr(t) to the eavesdropper E. Then the received
signals at R and E at time t are given by
yr(t) =
p
Eshsr(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhrr(t)jr(t) + nr(t);
ye(t) =
p
Eshse(t)xs(t) +
p
Erhre(t)jr(t) + ne(t);
(41)
respectively. At time (t + 1), the relay R works in the half
duplex mode that it only transmits the previously decoded
xs(t) to the destination, and switches off its receiving antenna.
At the same time, the source S transmits the jamming signal
js(t + 1) to the eavesdropper. Then at time (t + 1), the
eavesdropper receives the following signal
ye(t+ 1) =
p
Erhre(t+ 1)xs(t) +
p
Eshse(t+ 1)js(t+ 1)
+ ne(t+ 1):
(42)
Because we assume no direct link between S and D, the
jamming signal js(t+1) has no effect onD so that the received
signal at D is the same as that for the half duplex scheme
which is shown in (3). Then the transmission capacity can be
obtained as
Ct =
1
2
log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

: (43)
Comparing (21) and (43) shows that the full duplex and
full duplex jamming schemes have similar data transmission
capacity, except there is a “1=2” factor in the capacity of the
latter. This is because the data rate of the full duplex jamming
scheme is the same as that of the half duplex scheme.
On the other hand, from (41) and (42), the eavesdropping
capacity Cs is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2

1 +
se
re
+
re
se

: (44)
Substituting (43) and (44) into (4) gives the secrecy capacity
for the full duplex jamming scheme at the high SNR region
as
CFDJ =
1
2
log2

min

sr
rr + 1
; rd

  1
2
log2

1 +
se
re
+
re
se
+
:
(45)
B. Secrecy outage probability
Letting X = min

sr
rr+1
; rd

, Y = sere +
re
se
and Z =
X=(1 + Y ), the the secrecy outage probability is obtained as
PFDJ = P (CFDJ < Rs) = P

X
1 + Y
< 22Rs

= FZ(2
2Rs) =
Z 1
0
Z 22Rs (1+y)
0
fX(x)fY (y)dxdy:
(46)
Next we calculate the PDF of X and Y to derive (46). First,
taking the derivative of the CDF of X (which is shown in (38))
gives the PDF of X as
fX(x) =
e
  (sr+rd)xsrrd [(rd + sr)(rrx+ sr) + srrr]
(rrx+ sr)2rd
:
(47)
Then the PDF of Y , fY (y), can be obtained as (48) in the top
of the next page, where M = se=re. Substituting (47) and
72M3ln

[M+y][My+1]
M

(M2 +My2 +M + 1) +My(M6 + 2M5y +M4y2 +M4 + 2M3y +M2y2 +M2 + 2My + 1)
(M7 + 4M6y + 6M5y2 + 4M4y3 +M3y4 + 3M5 + 9M4y + 9M3y2 + 3M2y3 + 3M3 + 6M2y + 3My2 +M + y)(My + 1)
(48)
(48) into (46) gives
PFDJ =
Z 1
0
fY (y)
241  sre  2Rs (sr+rd)(y+1)srrd
2Rsrry + 2Rsrr + sr
35 dy:
(49)
While (49) is in an integral close form, it can be easily
obtained numerically with, for example Matlab or Maple [31].
C. Discussion
In either the full duplex or full duplex jamming scheme,
the eavesdropper receives signals from both source and relay
simultaneously. In the full duplex scheme, both received
signals at the eavesdropper are the data so that they can be
jointly decoded, leading to the similar eavesdropping capacity
to that for the half duplex scheme (except the “1=2” factor).
This has been clearly shown in Section III. While in the
jamming scheme, the eavesdropper always receives data from
one node and jamming signal from another node. The jam-
ming signals impose serious interference to the data decoding
at the eavesdropper, resulting in significant decrease in the
eavesdropping capacity.
On the other hand, for the data transmission, the jamming
scheme is still “half duplex” so that there is a “1=2” factor in
its data and eavesdropping capacities. The “1=2” factor, which
is equivalent to doubling the secrecy rate compared with the
full duplex scheme, deteriorates the secrecy performance in the
jamming scheme. It is clear from the definition of the secrecy
capacity that such deterioration is more serious for higher
target secrecy rate. This leads to an interesting observation:
when the target secrecy rate is small, the influence from the
“1=2” factor is also small, so that the jamming scheme has
significant better secrecy performance than the full duplex
scheme. But when the target secrecy rate becomes higher,
the secrecy difference between the jamming and full duplex
scheme becomes smaller. In fact, when the target secrecy rate
is high enough, the full duplex scheme may have better secrecy
performance than the jamming scheme. These will be very
well verified by the simulation in the next section.
We also note that, while the secrecy outage analysis in this
paper is for the relay network without a S ! D direct link,
the described half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming
schemes can be readily applied in the network with a S ! D
direct link. On the other hand, including the S ! D direct
link complicates the performance analysis without gaining
more insight into the half-/full- duplex relay which is the
main focus of this paper. Finally we would like to point out
that, while the secrecy performance analysis in this paper is
based on the knowledge of the channel-state-information (CSI)
for all channels (including the eavesdropping channels), the
implementation of the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex
jamming schemes do not rely upon the CSI knowledge.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, simulation results are given to verify the
above analysis, where “HDR”, “FDR” and “FDJ” represent
the half duplex, full duplex and full duplex jamming schemes
in following figures. In the simulations, the noise variances
2r , 
2
d and 
2
e and the source and relay transmission powers
Es and Er are all normalized to unity, and the block size
B = 1000. The simulation results are obtained by averaging
over 100; 000 independent runs.
Fig. 2 verifies the secrecy outage analysis of the full duplex
scheme in Section III-D, where we let rr = 0 dB and
sr = rd = 40 dB; the theoretical maximum and minimum
of the secrecy outage probability are obtained by (39) and
(40) respectively. In is clearly shown that, when the S ! E
and R ! E eavesdropping channels have similar gains
(se = re = 15 dB), the secrecy outage probability is close
to the minimum value. While when one of the eavesdropping
channels is weak (se = 25 dB and re = 10 dB), the
secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. In
any case, the difference between the maximum and minimum
secrecy outage probabilities are not significant. This verifies
the analysis in Section III-D. In following simulations, only
the simulation results for the full duplex scheme are shown
for better exposition.
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Fig. 2. Theoretical vs numerical secrecy outage probabilities for full
duplex relay scenario for sr = rd = 40 dB, rr = 0 dB.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability vs data trans-
mission SNR for HDR, FDR and FDJ, where we let sr = rd,
rr = 0 dB and se = re = 10 dB. Both the simulation and
theoretical results for the half duplex and full duplex jamming
schemes are presented, which are shown to be well matched.
This verifies the closed-form secrecy outage probabilities for
the half duplex and jamming schemes which are given by (14)
and (49) respectively. It is shown in Fig. 3 that, when the target
secrecy rate is small (Rs = 1), the jamming scheme has better
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probabilities vs channel SNR for HDR, FDR
and FDJ schemes, where sr = rd, se = re = 10 dB and rr = 0
dB.
secrecy performance than the full duplex scheme. But when
the target secrecy rate is large (Rs = 2), the jamming scheme
has slightly worse secrecy outage performance than the full
duplex scheme. In all cases, the half duplex has the worst
secrecy performance. These observations are exactly what we
expected in Section IV-C.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probabilities vs target secrecy rate for FDR,
FDJ and HDR schemes, where sr = rd = 40 dB and rr = 0 dB.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability vs target secrecy
rate for half duplex, full duplex and jamming schemes, where
we let sr = rd = 40 dB and rr = 0 dB. It is shown that,
for se = re = 20 dB, when the target secrecy rate is small
enough (RS < 4:7), the jamming scheme has better secrecy
outage performance than the full duplex scheme. This is
because the interference from jamming has more influence on
the secrecy performance than the “1/2” factor. When the target
rate becomes higher, the “1=2” factor in the capacities of the
jamming scheme starts to have more influence on the secrecy
performance. Until the target rate RS > 4:7, the jamming
scheme has higher secrecy outage probability than the full
duplex scheme. On the other hand, when se = re = 10 dB,
the jamming has less influence on the secrecy performance
than that for se = re = 20 dB. As a result, only when
RS < 1:7, the jamming scheme has better secrecy outage than
the full duplex scheme. Otherwise, it is the full duplex scheme
that has lower secrecy outage probability. This simulation
further verifies the analysis in Section IV-C
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy performance vs residual self-
interference rr for different approaches, where we let sr =
rd = 40 dB and se = re = 10 dB. It is clearly shown that,
when the secrecy target Rs = 2, the full duplex has better
performance than the half duplex scheme when rr < 9 dB.
But when Rs = 1, the full duplex has better performance
than the half duplex scheme only when rr < 5 dB. This
is what we expected, because the main reason for the full
duplex scheme to have better secrecy performance than the
half duplex scheme is the associated “1=2” factor in the
capacities, whose impact on the secrecy performance goes up
with higher data rate. It is also shown in Fig. 5 that, when
Rs = 1, the jamming scheme has better performance than the
full duplex scheme. And when Rs = 2, the jamming scheme
has slightly worse performance than the full duplex scheme.
The reason is the same as that in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probabilities vs residual self-interference rr
for FDR, FDJ and HDR schemes, where sr = rd = 40 dB and
se = re = 10 dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy performance of
a full duplex relay network and proposed the full duplex
jamming scheme to further improve the secrecy performance.
The secrecy outage probability of the half duplex, full duplex
and full duplex jamming schemes have been analyzed. The
analysis shows that, the full duplex scheme has better secrecy
performance than the half duplex scheme. On the other hand,
the proposed full duplex jamming scheme has better secrecy
performance than the full duplex scheme for small target
secrecy rate, and the improvement may disappear when the
target rate becomes large. The secrecy improvement of the
full duplex jamming scheme is at the price of data rate lose.
Numerical examples have been given to verify the analysis.
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